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WESTERN WATER LAW IN TRANSITION
CHARLES

F. WILKINSON*

There is an uneasy, unsettled air about western water law and
policy today. This is ironic and even revolutionary because certainty
is the central guarantee that water law has always held out in the
American West. Nevertheless, there is no denying that we are in the
process of reevaluating water law and policy and of adjusting old and
established uses in light of modern demands.
This transition, which is likely to accelerate, is born of a changing
society in the American West. Law tends over time to reflect societal
values, and this has always been signally true of western water law.
For this reason, it may be helpful to place matters in perspective by
looking briefly at the forces that historically have shaped water law
and at the new set of factors that are likely to determine it in years to
come.
The prior appropriation doctrine, the core of western water law,
was created to meet the felt needs of the mining camps during the
California gold rush.' Water law in the eastern United States and in
England employed the riparian doctrine, which recognized water
rights in each owner of land adjoining a stream or lake.2 Riparian
* Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law; currently Visiting Professor, University
of Colorado School of Law. B.A., 1963, Denison University; LL.B., 1966, Stanford University. This
article is an expanded and footnoted version of a paper presented at a conference entitled "The Future
of Western Water," sponsored by the Indian Resources Institute on November 30, 1984, in Scottsdale,
Arizona. Support for this project was provided by the Natural Resources Law Center at the University
of Colorado School of Law. I am -indebted to Sonny Cave for his able research assistance and editing
suggestions. Gary Weatherford, Ralph Johnson, John Thorson, Steve Shupe, and Jim Corbridge all
made valuable suggestions on various drafts of the manuscript and I thank them.
1. For a comprehensive and engaging history of western water rights, see R. DUNBAR, FORGING
NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS (1983).
2. On the riparian doctrine, see, e.g., Davis, The Right to Use Water in the Eastern States, in 7
WATER AND WATER RIGHTs 27-185 (R. Clark 1976) [hereinafter cited as Clark]; II W. HUTCHINS,
WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 1-144 (1974) (hereinafter cited as
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owners effectively shared the watercourse and were required to respect
the rights of other landowners to use water in the future. Thus,
although the riparian decisions display some deference to existing economic uses,3 a landowner could not substantially diminish the flow of
a river because of the duty to respect possible future water
development.
Riparian law viewed the watershed as an integral natural unit.
Exportation out of the watershed was prohibited or disfavored. Water
was valued as an amenity that added considerably to the worth and
beauty of all parcels of land along the watercourse.
This was nonsense to the utilitarian miners who flooded to the
gold- and silver-bearing deposits of the West in the middle of the nineteenth century. They were there on business, not in pursuit of amenities. Water was the linchpin of the miners' operations, whether they
were washing river gravel away from the gold dust and nuggets with
pans, sluices or long toms; slashing away at hillsides with high-power
hydraulic hoses used to blast out placer deposits; or transporting water
twenty miles or more to remote mining towns such as Mokelumne Hill
or Columbia by means of the serpentine canals that still wind across
the gold country.4

Thus mining was water intensive from the beginning. In addiHUTCHINS]; Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 621 (1968). Although
riparian law is sometimes stated to be an English creation, American cases such as Tyler v. Wilkinson,
24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.R.I. 1827), had a significant impact in the English decisions. On the development
of the doctrine, see generally Maas & Zobel, Anglo-American Water Law: Who Appropriated the Riparian Doctrine? 10 PUB. POLICY 109 (1960).
3. See, e.g., Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 321, 58 N.E. 142, 147 (1900) ("It is also
material, sometimes, to ascertain which party first erected his works and began to appropriate the
water."). The Restatement of Torts explicitly includes "the protection of existing values of water uses,
land, investments and enterprises" as one of the balancing factors in determining the extent of riparian
rights. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 85OA(h) (1979).

4. On the role of the water supply in early mining operations, see generally R. PAUL, CALIFORNIA GOLD: THE BEGINNING OF MINING IN THE FAR WEST 147-70 (1947). Paul quotes the following

excerpt from the Sacramento Weekly Union, July 22, 1854, concerning the use of hydraulic power at a
claim at Iowa Hill:
With a perpendicular column of water 120 feet high, in a strong hose, of which they work
two, ten men who own the claim are enabled to run off hundreds of tons of dirt daily. So
great is the force employed, that two men with the pipes, by directing streams of water against
the base of the high bank, will cut it away to such an extent as to cause immense slides of
earth, which often bring with them large trees and heavy boulders. To carry off these immense masses of dirt they have constructed two sluices, one for the paying and the other for
the non-paying dirt. . . . After these immense masses of earth are undermined and brought
down by the streams forced from the pipes, those same streams are turned upon the tons of
fallen earth, and it melts away before them, and is carried away through the sluices with
almost as much rapidity as if it were a bank of snow. No such labor-saving power has ever
been introduced to assist the miner in his operations.
Id. at 155.
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tion, water was scarce in those hot, dry foothills. The mining camps
had no use for a riparian law, developed thousands of miles away in
country where water was plentiful, that called for most water to be left
as is. Water was not an amenity in gold rush times, it was an engine.
Mining-that is, society- could not proceed unless water could be
assured in sufficient and certain quantities.
The miners developed their own customs. Just as the first miner
to stake a claim was accorded the right to work the area, 5 so too was
the first user of water considered to have an absolute right of priority.
The Supreme Court of the first western state, California, promptly
approved the miners' rules in Irwin v. Phillips.6 In this justly famous
opinion, the justices stated that "courts are bound to take notice of the
political and social condition of the country which they judicially
rule." 7 The practice of respecting senior uses of water had been
"firmly fixed" by "a universal sense of necessity and propriety" in the
mining camps, and the court upheld those societal values.' Congress
approved of the miners' ground rules in 1866 and 1870.' Beginning
with Colorado,'" the Rocky Mountain states followed suit, as did the
United States Supreme Court, which announced in 1935 that local
laws generally governed the acquisition of water rights in the West."1
These rules comprised the prior appropriation doctrine, which
has become the deeply ingrained water law of every western state,
although California, Washington, and Nebraska retain remnants of
the riparian scheme. Prior appropriation rejects the riparian doctrine
wholesale. The first user gets a guaranteed supply of water. In times
of shortage, junior users are cut off according to their order of priority.
There is no sharing of water. There is no need to preserve water in a
watercourse. A stream or lake can be drained low or dried up entirely,
as has occurred with hundreds of western rivers and streams, even the
lower Colorado. These precepts reflect the belief that the wisest state
5. See, e.g., Hicks v. Bell, 3 Cal. 219 (1853).

6. 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
7. Id. at 146.
8. Id. On the background of Irwin v. Phillips, see Littlefield, Water Rights During the California
Gold Rush: Conflicts Over Economic Points of View, XIV WEST. HisT. Q. 415, 429-31 (1983).
9. See Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (confirming rights-of-way and appropriations of

water on the public lands, as against claims by the United States, if established pursuant to state law or
local custom); Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 217, 218 (providing that all subsequent federal
patents would be subject to rights established under the Act of 1866).
10. See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
11. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64 (1935)
("What we hold is that following the [Desert Land Act] of 1877, if not before, all nonnavigable waters
then a part of the public domain became publicijuris,subject to the plenary control of the designated
states ..
"). The case is discussed infra note 38.
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policy is a passive one: decisions on water use are best made by the
private water users themselves.
Ranchers and farmers made up the next waves of settlers in the
westward expansion. They, too, saw water as a commodity that was
the essential resource in their operations. In most of the arid region
west of the 100th meridian, annual precipitation averages less than
twenty inches, the amount of water needed to dryfarm-that is, to
farm with rainfall only. Almost everywhere in the West, water must
be taken out of watercourses and applied artificially to the fields by
irrigation. Appropriation law was well suited to meet the needs of
farmers who depended on irrigation. The doctrine assured early appropriators of legal rights to a sure supply of water to put on their
fields.
But in many areas throughout the West small farmers required
more than a legal doctrine to get water to their fields. Crops needed
water in the late summer and early fall, long after snowmelt from the
mountains had flowed past. Potentially fertile farming areas often
were located far from the rivers or on benchlands high above steep
canyon walls. Private enterprise in the form of farming and ranching
cooperative associations was inadequate to raise the capital to build
dams for storing the spring runoff for summer irrigation or to con12
struct canals and laterals for transporting the water.
The federal government, keen to complete the settlement of the
West, stepped in. The Reclamation Act of 190213 authorized funding
for most of the big irrigation projects that now dot the region. Homestead entries boomed as new waves of settlers moved west to capitalize
on the offer of nearly free farmland and water. 4 The reclamation program was heavily subsidized from the beginning-billions of federal
dollars have been expended to provide cheap western water.15 Subsi12. On various l9th-century attempts to bring irrigation water to the arid lands of the West, see
P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 635-54 (1968). Wallace Stegner poignantly depicts a futile attempt to bring water to the now-verdant Boise Valley in ANGLE OF REPOSE
(1971).
13. 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-600(e) (1982).
14. Although the original Homestead Act was enacted in 1862 and numerous variations on the
theme were adopted by Congress both before and after, the two most active decades in the actual
issuance of homestead patents were the 20 years immediately following the Reclamation Act of 1902.
The most productive year was 1910, when entries were made on approximately 23 million acres. G.
COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 73 (1979).
15.

See generally NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 145-47

(1973); Sax, Selling Reclamation Water Rights: A Case Study in Federal Subsidy Policy, 64 MICH. L.
REv. 13 (1965); Ellis & DuMars, The Two-Tiered Market in Western Water, 57 NEB. L. REV. 245
(1978); Wilson, Reclamation Subsidies and Their Present-Day Impact, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 497. About
15% of all water in the west is supplied by the Bureau of Reclamation. IV U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, 1969 Census of Agriculture 82-83.
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dized water for farming is also developed and supplied by special
water districts, quasi-governmental organizations created under state
law and usually dominated by irrigation interests. 16 Today, even accounting for the burgeoning water needs of the cities, irrigation consumes nearly ninety percent of all water in the West.17
These forces have been the main currents of traditional western
water law. The field has been dominated by the themes of appropriation under state law; stable priority for historic uses; concern for private rights over public rights; preference for consumptive, usually
commercial, uses; and the provision of subsidized water for irrigators.
It goes virtually without saying that this range of nineteenth and early
twentieth century priorities is not as broad as the spectrum of considerations that must be accommodated in current water policy.
First, we have become increasingly aware of budgetary restraints
on governments. Subsidies of all stripes are increasingly being called
into question. Second, the press of the continuing migration to the
West has created unprecedented strains on water supplies, thus intensifying the scrutiny of wasteful practices. Third, post-World War II
innovations in high-lift pumping equipment have allowed us to begin
to tap the potential of the great reservoirs of ground water. But, as
shortages have developed, we have learned that many ground water
aquifers are not renewable resources in the sense that surface waters
are; the annual recharge of some aquifers is so small that they amount
to stock resources that can be mined out, much like oil or coal deposits. Further, we have learned that ground water is usually hydrologi16. Special water districts deliver about one-half of all western water, some of it supplied to them

by the Bureau of Reclamation. State laws allow most special districts to issue tax-exempt bonds. Voting rights and other aspects of participation in district activities, however, are often based on acreage
ownership (one acre, one vote), even when district boundaries reach into urban areas. With voting
weighted toward irrigation interests, the districts are able to promote and fund projects, encourage
investment through the use of the tax-exempt bonds, provide subsidized water mainly for irrigation,
and obligate all persons residing within district boundaries. A requirement that directors of the Impe-

rial Irrigation District must be landowners was struck down in California. Choudhry v. Free, 17 Cal.
3d 660, 552 P.2d 438, 131 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1976). The weighted voting structure of the Salt River
Project in Arizona, however, has withstood constitutional challenges. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355
(1981). Justice White has accurately analyzed the effects of these voting provisions:
It is apparent in this case that landowning irrigators are getting a free ride at the expense of
the users of electricity. It would also seem apparent that except for the subsidy, utility rates

would be lower. Of course, subsidizing agricultural operations may well be in the public
interest in Arizona, but it does not follow that the amount of the subsidy and the manner in
which it is provided should be totally in the hands of a select few.
Id. at 384 (dissenting opinion of Justice White). On special irrigation districts, see generally Special Project: IrrigationDistricts, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 345; NATURAL RESOURCES LAW CENTER, SPECIAL WATER DISTRICTS: CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE (J. Corbridge ed. 1985).
17. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, WESTWIDE STUDY REPORT ON CRITICAL
WATER PROBLEMS FACING THE ELEVEN WESTERN STATES 46-47 (1975).
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cally related to surface water, so that the traditional system of
managing surface water and ground water separately fails to reflect the
hydrologic reality: conjunctive management of underground and surface resources is required when the two connect up.1 8 Fourth, we have
become determined to abate water pollution, an issue given little or no
attention in prior appropriation law. 9
Fifth, we have revolutionized our concept of what western water
is. It is no longer simply a commodity to be removed from a watercourse for use on farmland or in a factory. There is life and beauty in
water. It is a valid use of water simply to allow it to remain in a
stream or lake. In a sense, after first rejecting the riparian rule so
resoundingly, we have reconsidered and have reached a deeply held
consensus that there is undeniable merit in some aspects of riparianism: sufficient water absolutely must be available to meet a broad
range of public environmental, recreational, ecological, and aesthetic
needs. 20
Finally, we have come to recognize that this body of water law
and policy bred of the westward expansion must begin to account for
the rights of Indians, to whom legally binding promises were made in
order to open aboriginal land and resources for those who settled the
West. 2' The truth is that since 1908, if not earlier, the main players in
western water development have known that a shadow body of law
existed based on the Winters doctrine.2 2 They have known, too, that
water allocated in contravention of the Winters doctrine might someday be called into question. The Western States Water Council re18. On groundwater, see generally R. FREEZE & J. CHERRY, GROUNDWATER (1979). On conjunctive use, see Trelease, Conjunctive Use of Groundwater and Surface Water, 27B ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 1853 (1982). See also, e.g., Aiken, Ground Water Mining Law and Policy, 53 U. COLO. L.
REV. 505 (1982).
19. See generally W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 354-550 (1977) and 187-205 (Supp.
1984).
20. These conclusions are reflected in a number of modern movements, including the setting aside
of large areas of land as wilderness, e.g., R. NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (1983 rev.
ed.); the increased concern for the rights of animals, e.g., M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
WILDLIFE LAW (1983); the increased demand for recreational uses of water, e.g., Wilderness Public
Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1979); the provision in most western states for the
establishment of instream, nonconsumptive water flows, e.g., Tarlock, Appropriationfor Instream Flow
Maintenance: A ProgressReport on "New" Public Western Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 211; and
the attention given to water issues in essays and works of fiction by modern western writers, e.g., E.
ABBEY, BEYOND THE WALL (1984); J. NICHOLS, THE MILAGRO BEANFIELD WAR (1974); W.
STEGNER, THE SOUND OF MOUNTAIN WATER (1969).
21. On Indian treaties, see F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 62-70 (1982 ed.).
22. Federal power to preempt state water law was suggested in cases such as Willson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829), United States v.Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174
U.S. 690 (1899), and United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), but the first major explication of the
doctrine was in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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cently prepared a report for the Western Governors' Association
concluding that Indian water rights across the West may total over
forty-five million acre feet per year, an amount more than three times
the annual flow of the Colorado River.2 3 That figure was rough, no
more than a conscientious attempt to approximate the magnitude of
the issue. But it stands in stark testament to the fact that Indian water
rights are of front-line significance in modern western water policy.
Questions of equity pervade the dispute over Indian water rights.
Farmers and ranchers built their operations, and their homes and families, on water rights they believed to be certain. They point to decrees
issued by state judges to that effect. At the same time, the reclamation
program proceeded on the backs of Indian people. Western water issues cannot be dealt with now or in the years to come without squarely
confronting the legal and moral force of these words written by the
National Water Commission in 1973:
Following Winters, more than 50 years elapsed before the
Supreme Court again discussed significant aspects of Indian
water rights. During most of this 50-year period, the United
States was pursuing a policy of encouraging the settlement of
the West and the creation of family-sized farms on its arid
lands. In retrospect, it can be seen that this policy was pursued
with little or no regard for Indian water rights and the Winters
doctrine. With the encouragement, or at least the cooperation,
of the Secretary of the Interior-the very office entrusted with
protection of all Indian rights-many large irrigation projects
were constructed on streams that flowed through or bordered
Indian Reservations, sometimes above and more often below
the Reservations. With few exceptions the projects were
planned and built by the Federal Government without any attempt to define, let alone protect, prior rights that Indian tribes
might have had in the waters used for the projects. . . . In the
history of the United States Government's treatment of Indian
tribes, its failure to protect Indian water rights for use on the
Reservations it set aside for them is one of the sorrier
chapters.
24
Those, then, are the major developments and perceptions that
have set a new context for western water law. Let me now speak to
the manner in which these factors have shaken traditional concepts
and will shape future law and policy.
My first point is one that may not seem fashionable at this junc23. See WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST (1984).
24. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 15, at 474-75.
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ture in history: it is that a significant federal presence in western water
law and policy exists now, is unavoidable, and will steadily grow. I am
not speaking here of dollars for reclamation projects, a kind of federal
involvement western development interests have long coveted but that
is sure to remain in decline. Rather, I refer to a range of substantive
issues that lend themselves to national attention.
The inexorable demands of geography make persistent inroads on
the fiercely held localism that drives most state water officials and
leaders in the consumptive industries. The angular design of the western states almost wholly fails to account for water basin configurations. A short stretch of the Continental Divide along part of the
Montana-Idaho border is the only place west of the 100th meridian
where a river drainage marks a political boundary. Great rivers such
as the Columbia and the Colorado are used as state lines, inviting
water disputes. Only one of our major western river systems-the
Sacramento-San Joaquin of California--exists within just one state.
Only one other, the Klamath of Oregon and California, keeps within
two states. All of the rest-the Upper Missouri, the Platte, the Arkansas, the Rio Grande, the Colorado, and the Columbia system- are
multistate rivers. Each of their basins has numerous Indian reservations with federally guaranteed water rights. Further, the upper Missouri, Rio Grande, Colorado, Columbia, and several smaller rivers
carry obligations to Canada or Mexico. Indeed, water policy on the
Columbia is so encompassing that, for example, it must account for
the fact that Idaho salmon travel thousands of miles in their lifetimes;
these fish not only are harvested by sports, commercial, and tribal fishers in Idaho, Oregon, and Washington, but also are pursued by sports
and commercial fishers in Alaska as well as by Canadian, Russian, and
Japanese boats. 25 The inland Columbia River tribes filed suit against
the state of Alaska for its regulatory practices involving Columbia
River salmon. 26 The multifaceted pressures on the Columbia have led,
among other things, to federal regulation of water flows in the Columbia to create favorable conditions for young salmon and steelhead
heading out to sea.27
Western water-a moving, interstate, even international, resource
25. See Wilkinson & Conner, The Law of the PacificSalmon Fishery: Conservationand Allocation
ofa Transboundary Common Property Resource, 32 KAN. L. REV. 17 (1983).
26. Yakima Indian Nation v. Baldridge, No. CB0-342 T (W.D. Wash.) (filed June 4, 1982). The
many parties have entered into a stipulation that effectively stays the litigation by agreeing that the

primary mechanism for resolving the issues should not be the litigation but rather a commission established by the United States/Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty, signed at Ottawa on January 28, 1985.
Stipulation and Order, id. (March 7, 1985).
27. See infra note 45.
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sought by numerous commercial, recreational, and political interests-is not logically a matter to be left to the sole discretion of any
single local jurisdiction. We have seen the federalizing of similar resource issues, including air pollution, toxic wastes, and even water pollution.28 All of those programs allow considerable flexibility to the
states, but essentially the states must find a way to achieve national
standards. Ultimately, the pressures in these areas of natural resources
law are not fundamentally different from the forces that led us to
adopt national programs in areas such as shipping, securities and antitrust regulation, and labor relations.
Of course, historical factors often transcend logic, even the logic
of political geography, and that has been preeminently true in western
water policy. A mixture of industrial clout, pressure from state water
agencies, a lack of concern on the part of eastern political interests,
and a generally admirable desire of westerners to be left alone all have
worked together to form the "Iron Triangle"-one point comprised of
private western water development interests and the state agencies; another corner in the federal water development agencies; and a final
point in the key congressional subcommittees controlled on these issues by western congressmen. The Iron Triangle blunted much of the
compelling logic of comprehensive planning and created a system of
outside funding and internal control, the best of both possible worlds
for development interests: Congress provided heavily subsidized federal projects, but the water was distributed in accordance with state
law, which in turn gave preferences to the consumptive users favored
by the commodity-oriented developers represented in the Iron Triangle.2 9 Federal funding of western water development projects became
"almost ritualistic. ' ' 30
The states continue to play a paramount role in western water
law and policy, especially in determining rights to the use of water.3 '
This dominance of state law, however, has seen a series of inroads
since about World War II. The Secretary of the Interior effectively
decreed water rights on the lower Colorado among the lower basin
states by entering into water delivery contracts, and the Supreme
28. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982); Federal

Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
29. See P. FRADKIN, A RIVER No MORE: THE COLORADO RIVER AND THE WEST 61-62 (1981).
30.

A. KNEESE & F. LEE BROWN, THE SOUTHWEST UNDER STRESS: NATIONAL RESOURCE

DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN A REGIONAL SETrING 76 (1981).

31. The leading statement by the Supreme Court on congressional deference to state water law is
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). For a comprehensive review of California v. United
States, the Reclamation Act of 1902, and congressional deference to state water law, see Kelley, Staging
a Comeback- Section 8 of the Reclamation Act, 18 U.C.D.L. REV. 97 (1984).
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Court upheld the administrative action. 3 2 The Supreme Court enforces the demands of federalism by refereeing disputes among states
in interstate watersheds.3 3 The federal pollution laws have taken ef-

fect. 34 The Endangered Species Act requires sufficient flows to protect
covered species.3 5 Various laws regulating salmon and steelhead harvesting have affected water allocations.3 6 The 1982 decision in
Sporhase v. Nebraska3 7 made it clear that the demands of interstate
commerce can override the desire of any single state to ban exports of
water. The Court found that states regulate water but do not own it,
calling the notion of state ownership of water "a legal fiction." 38 A
new era in management of the federal public lands, which comprise

forty-eight percent of all land in the eleven western states, has imprinted water policy by promoting erosion-preventing practices on federal timber and range lands, by protecting key high-elevation
watershed lands, by establishing wild and scenic rivers, and by setting

reserved rights in many federal landholdings, including national parks,
32. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
33. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 104 S.Ct. 2433 (1984); Texas v. New Mexico, 103 S. Ct.
2558 (1983).
34. See supra note 28.
35. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982). See, e.g., Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark,
741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. pending; Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th
Cir. 1985).
36. See generally infra notes 44-45.
37. 458 U.S. 941 (1982). See Tarlock, So It's Not "Ours"- Why Can't We Still Keep It? A First
Look at Sporhase v. Nebraska, 18 LAND & WATER L. REV. 137 (1983). The most recent decision on
the issue is City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984) (upholding constitutionality
of most aspects of New Mexico's statute regulating groundwater transports, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7212B-1).
38. 458 U.S. at 951. This has not stopped state courts from continuing to rely on the fiction of
state ownership of water. See, e.g., Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 166
(Mont. 1984).
State authority over water is ample, but it is based on reserved power under the tenth amendment,
not on ownership. The famous statement in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement
Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163-64 (1935) ("What we hold is that following the [Desert Land Act] of 1877, ifnot
before, all nonnavigable waters then a part of the public domain became publici juris, subject to the
plenary control of the designated states....") is itself a legal fiction based on concepts of ownership.
There was no need to "sever" water from the public domain, id. at 158, to establish state regulatory
authority-such power always existed by dint of the tenth amendment unless preempted by federal
authority. Thus state courts were correct in applying state water law on the public lands from the
beginning. See, e.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 9 Cal. 140 (1855). Cf., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645
(1978) (state law applies to federal reclamation projects unless overridden by specific congressional
provision); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (Congress has authority to establish
federal reserved rights but state water law applies unless federal power actually exercised); Andrus v.
Charlestone Stone Products, Inc., 436 U.S. 604, 614 (1978) (congressional water policy in the mining
laws has been "passive" and has "affirmed the view that private water rights on federal lands were to
be governed by local law and custom."). See generally Trelease, Uneasy Federalism-State Water Laws
and National Water Uses, 55 WASH. L. REV. 751, 758-68 (1980); Wilkinson, The Field of Public Land
Law: Some Connecting Thread and Future Directions, 1 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 19-23 (1980).

1985]

WESTERN WATER LAW IN TRANSITION

wildlife refuges, and wilderness areas.3 9 And, of course, the balance
point has shifted-although we are years from knowing how far-by
the determination of Indian tribes to assert their Winters rights in order to help fulfill the essential treaty promise that their reservations be
homelands.
State domination of water policy, then, has been grudgingly
eroded, in fits and starts, on a number of fronts. We have developed,
and will hold to, a policy matrix that recognizes a set of legitimate
state interests in the allocation of water but that also accommodates
larger national interests including the needs of downstream states and
nations, water quality, recreation, the environment, and Indian tribes.
I do not pretend to be able to predict with complete accuracy the
substance of future federal involvement. It is likely to include increased local cost-sharing and financing schemes," but national participation in western water projects will continue, with subsidies of a
much lesser magnitude and surely with greater concern for Indian interests. I expect that there will be few, if any, new projects without an
Indian component. In addition, in spite of bitter opposition from development interests, environmentalists may succeed in lobbying Congress and the public land agencies for expanded federal requirements
for instream flows to protect recreation and wildlife on federal lands.
Further, we may well be near some form of federally mandated water
conservation practices, especially concerning interstate ground water
aquifers such as the Ogallala, where shortages are already so acute
that valuable farmland has been forced out of production.4"
The institutional form of federal action will be important in itself.
Perhaps it will be in the fashion of administrative intervention, of
which we have had one dramatic example when Interior Secretary Andrus used the Central Arizona Project as a lever to pressure Arizona
into adopting a reform ground water code to conserve water and protect Indian water rights.4 2 Such jawboning has been employed by the
Interior Department in the past to encourage modernizing of state
39. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (national monument); Sierra Club v.
Block, 14 E.L.R. 20626 (D. Colo. 1984) (wilderness areas); United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d I (Colo.

1982) (national park and monument); Federal Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish & Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation, and Bureau of Land Management, 88 Interior Decisions 553
(1979) (Interior Department agencies, National Wilderness Preservation System, and National Wild
and Scenic River System). Reserved rights in national forests were construed strictly in United States

v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
40. See R. SMITH, TROUBLED WATERS: FINANCING WATER IN THE WEST

(1984).

41. See, e.g., M. BITrINGER & E. GREEN, You NEVER MISS THE WATER TILL ...
OGALLALA STORY) (1980).
42.

(THE

See, e.g., P. WILEY & R. GOTTLIEB, EMPIRES IN THE SUN: THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERI-

CAN WEST 182 (1982). See also infra note 101.
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water laws.4 3 We do well to remember that the federal funding sought
by the states implicitly vests federal water agencies with such informal
authority should they choose to exercise it.
New federal multipurpose water legislation could well look to the
creation of regional bodies with state representation in recognition of
the historic state role. One model is the Northwest Power Planning
Council, established by the Northwest Power Act of 1980 to set energy
and fisheries policy-major components of water policy-in the Columbia River Basin."4 The Power Planning Council is created by federal law, and must meet a congressionally established mandate, but it
is not a federal agency. Each of the four states appoints two members
to the Commission, which is directed, among other things, to protect
Indian fishing and water rights, instream flows, and wild fish runs.4 5 It
is an innovative attempt to attack the seemingly intractable water policy issues of the Pacific Northwest. The issues elsewhere are different-there are many more cattle, and many fewer salmon, in the
upper Missouri and the Colorado basins than in the Columbia-but
the institutional arrangement set out in the Northwest Power Act
might be an appropriate way to give proper recognition both to national needs and state prerogatives.
But, whatever the specifics and whatever the positions of the current administration, my view is that people in this field act at their
own peril if they fail to recognize the probability of an expanded federal role-not in the historic arena of funding development projects,
but rather in the sphere of adopting substantive requirements to meet
pressing contemporary needs. A set of large challenges must be resolved-hopefully soon-and their scope is such that the states by
themselves cannot hope to tackle all aspects of them.
The second development I wish to explore is, in my judgment,
likely to be far and away the most important substantive movement in
both state and federal policy in the foreseeable future. It is conservation of water, the essential policy element in seeing that enough water
is available for both old and new uses. Conservation will influence or
43. See, e.g., R. DUNBAR, supra note 1, at 115-16, 120.
44. See Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (Northwest Power
Act), 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1982). On the legislative history of the Act, see Blumm & Johnson,
Promisinga Processfor Parity: The Pacific Northwest Electric PowerPlanningand ConservationAct and
Anadromous Fish Protection, 11 ENVTL. L. 497 (1981).
45. In implementing the 1980 Act, a major thrust of the Northwest Power Planning Council has
been to focus on preservation of wild fish runs and maintenance of instream flows. One program has
been the establishment of a "water budget," by which state fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes
agree upon the release of a fixed volume of water during the spring runoff (April 15-June 15 of each
year) in order to facilitate downstream migration of juvenile salmon and steelhead. See Wilkinson &
Conner, supra note 25, at 92-94.
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determine most proposed projects, disputes involving Indian water
rights, and environmental controversies. Such a statement does not
negate the fact that techniques other than conservation of water will
doubtless be employed to distribute water to new uses in an efficient
manner. Various devices will be employed to free up the transfer of
water by reducing the costs and legal barriers that are now attendant
to leases and sales.46 We will see some interbasin transfers, although
not the grandiose schemes for iceberg-towing, for undersea aqueducts,
or for pipelines to transport water to the Southwest from the Columbia Basin or Hudson Bay.47 They are neither cost effective nor politically or environmentally acceptable.
The primary method for dealing with the critical issue of creating
new water supplies will be to conserve water from existing supplies.48
For generations, water conservation has been defined chiefly as the
construction of new water projects. But most of those proposals will
have difficulty satisfying the scrutiny of this newly cost-conscious field.
In addition, nearly all of the prime dam sites in the West have already
been utilized. Even more fundamentally, water storage projects are
conservation projects only in the sense that they capture water that
would otherwise flow out to sea. True water conservation is a much
broader concept requiring users to employ waste-saving practices
designed to ensure that all, or a great percentage of, water is actually
applied to the intended use and not to leaks, spills, or evaporation. A
major source of new water is the conservation of water in existing
49

uses.

Literally every comprehensive study of water policy has stressed
the central importance of conserving water.50 There is waste in indus46. See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 15, at 260-70. See generally Ellis &

DuMars, supra note 15, at 356-58, and the authorities cited therein.
47. See, e.g., R. Schad, Western Water Resources: Means to Augment the Supply, in SYMPOSIUM,
WESTERN WATER RESOURCES: COMING PROBLEMS AND THE POLICY ALTERNATIVES at 113 (1980).

48. Water conservation is discussed comprehensively in Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A
Blueprint for Change, 61 OR. L. REV. 483 (1982); WATER AND AGRICULTURE IN THE WESTERN
UNITED STATES: CONSERVATION, REALLOCATION AND MARKETS (G. Weatherford ed. 1982) [here-

inafter cited as Weatherford];

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, WATER CONSER-

VATION IN CALIFORNIA (1984); CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT: AN

ASSESSMENT AT MID-DECADE (1985); Pring & Tomb, License to Waste: Legal Barriers to Conservation and Efficient use of Water in the West, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1 (1979); Kramer &
Turner, Prevention of Waste or Unreasonable Use of Water: The California Experience, I AGRIC. L.J.

519 (1980).
49. We have, of course, begun to apply this principle in the field of energy, where the pressure for
development of new sources has been somewhat reduced by conservation practices. Water policy and
energy policy can coincide, as is the case with production of hydroelectric and steam-electric power,
both of which require large amounts of water.
50. See generally, NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 15; United States Department of

Interior, Westwide Study Report on Critical Water Problems Facing the Eleven Western States (1975);
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try and in municipal systems, but misuse of water by irrigators holds
special significance because so much water in the West is devoted to
that purpose. Water waste is not an entirely precise term and can be
given various physical and legal definitions. When I use the phrase in
the irrigation context, I mean to include as waste any water unnecessary for farming if modem irrigation practices are employed; most
water should be consumed by the crop, with some unavoidable losses
in conveyance and application and, in some cases, for leaching of
salts.5 ' Thus elimination of waste in this commonly accepted sense
does not require absolute efficiency but it does call for the elimination
of antiquated practices.
Although irrigation efficiency has improved in some areas, outmoded and inefficient irrigation practices continue to result in massive
waste of water in most regions of the West. The primary causes are
excessive runoff and seepage from 'uneven fields; seepage from earthen
irrigation canals; evaporation from reservoirs and open conveyancing
systems; excessive application of irrigation water to fields; and evapotranspiration by phreatophytes (noncrop, water-loving plants that consume large quantities of water).52 The United States Soil Conservation
Service (SCS) estimates that total annual water waste due to irrigation
amounts to twenty-four million acre feet per year.53 Thus, if the SCS's
rough estimate is substantially accurate, each year irrigators cause an
irrecoverable loss of water that is almost double the annual flow of the
Colorado River and that exceeds the total volume of water consumed
by all municipalities and industries in the nation.5 4 Because of the
high incidence of water use by western irrigators and because of wideGovernor's Comm'n to Review California's Water Law, Final Report (1978); United States Water
Resources Council, The Nation's Water Resources 1975-2000 (1979).
51. Definitions of waste are discussed in Shupe, supra note 48, at 489-91. Modern irrigation practices are discussed infra note 58, and accompanying text, and infra note 104 in connection with the
Arizona Groundwater Management Act of 1980. One rule that has been used to justify excessive diversions is that irrigators need comply only with the conservation practices used by other irrigators in the
local area. See, e.g., Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal.2d 489, 45
P.2d 972, 997 (1935) (an irrigator "is entitled to make reasonable use of the water according to the
general custom of the locality, so long as the custom does not involve unnecessary waste.")
52. See, e.g., U.S. Soil Conservation Service, Crop Consumptive Irrigation Requirements and Irrigation Efficiency Coefficients for the United States (Appendix to the National Analysis, Second National Water Assessment) (1976); U.S. Comptroller General, More and Better Uses Could Be Made of
Billions of Gallons of Water By Improving Irrigation Delivery Systems (GAO CED-77-117, Sept. 2,
1977); U.S. General Accounting Office, Better Water Management Possible-But Constraints Need to
be Overcome (GAO CED-79-1, Oct. 31, 1978).
53. U.S. Soil Conservation Service, supra note 52, at 17. A similar conclusion was reached in
Departments of Interior and Agriculture and Environmental Protection Agency, Interagency Task
Force Report: Irrigation Water Use and Water 22-23 (1979) (loss of 21.1 million acre feet). Both
estimates are for irrecoverable losses to the stream systems.
54. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 15, at 11.

1985]

WESTERN WATER LAW IN TRANSITION

spread wasteful practices, irrigation in western states has been described by the United States Water Resources Council as "a prime
candidate for water conservation"55 and by the National Water Commission as affording "the greatest potential, as well as the greatest
need, for water savings."5.6
Developing an effective program to combat waste of irrigation
water is no simple task. Irrigation interests dominate water politics in
both the state capitals and in Washington, D.C. In addition, identifying true waste is not always easy. Water from leaky ditches or from an
overwatered field may reenter the stream as return flow and be available to downstream users. More efficient irrigation systems employing pumps or sprinklers may consume large amounts of electricity or
gasoline, thus conflicting with the goal of energy conservation. In
some cases, removing phreatophytes and lining canals can destroy
wildlife habitat. 57 Further, there are important social and cultural issues. No one wants to declare war on the western rancher or farmer.
Many marginal operations would be jeopardized by rigid conservation
requirements that must be met immediately. It is unacceptable to
force an end to farming and ranching operations and to the local traditions and open space that they contribute to the American West.
Nevertheless, good conservation practices can, over time, be
adopted for western irrigation. Pioneer-style earthen ditches can be
lined with cement to eliminate leaks and encroachment by
phreatophytes. Water can be saved on fields by abandoning flood irrigation in favor of furrow, sprinkler, or trickle irrigation, methods that
distribute water evenly and efficiently. Water can be conserved by laser-leveling of fields so that water does not collect in low spots or run
off on slopes or in gulleys.58 All of us should support tax incentives,
low-interest loans, and other programs to provide incentives for farmers to achieve these ends. 59
55. United States Water Resources Council, supra note 50, vol. 1 at 21.
56. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 15, at 299. In addition to its impact on water
quantity, irrigation is a major factor in water pollution. Eg.,-Johnson, Our Salty Rivers: Legal and
Institutional Approaches to Salinity Management, 13 LAND & WATER L. REv. 441 (1978).
57. See, e.g., Ohmart, A Riparian Caie History: The Colorado River, found in: Importance, Preservation, and Management of Riparian 'Habitat: A Symposium, U.S.D.A. General Technical Report
RM-43 at 35-47 (1977) (describing bird species exhibiting a strong preference for cottonwood habitats,
which are comprised of phreatophytes such as cottonwood, willow, mesquite, and the recently introduced salt cedar or Tamarix).
58. These and other conservation measures are discussed in depth in Shupe, supra note 48, at 50110. Importantly, Shupe points to a range of benefits to farmers, including reduced production costs,
erosion control, and -salinity amelioration,, from good conservation practices. Id. at 513-17. See also
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, WATER CONSERVATION IN CALIFORNIA 59-117
,(1984).
59. .Several western state legislatures have provided loans and grants to irrigators for water devel-
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But incentive programs must be accompanied by the sharp edge
of compulsion. First, pricing policy should beused to phase out subsidies for water users and to force conservation by delivering water at its
actual, higher cost. As The Conservation Foundation has said, "only
rarely in the United States does any government treat water as if it
were a valuable commodity."'
With few exceptions, western states
allow appropriations from streams, lakes, and aquifers without charge.
Most developed water is supplied at subsidized rates; federal irrigation
water is priced at nineteen percent of its real cost. 61 We should allow
the message of reform-minded resource economists to take hold: the
incentive to save water will be diminished so long as water can be
62
obtained at an artificially low cost'

Second, the courts and administrative agencies should accelerate
the enforcement of the prohibitions against waste that have always
been part of western water law. The state codes prohibit waste of
water and typically make it a misdemeanor. 61' Historically these provisions have been mostly theoretical, as courts -andwater agencies have
6 Modern decisions, however, have
seldom cracked down on waste.M
begun to take on a very different cast. The doctrine of beneficial use
has always been said to prohibit waste;6 5 several recent opinions have
opment projects, some of which have been used for conservation programs. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE & U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, IRRIGATION WATER USE AND MANAGEMENT 12 (1979). It follows from what
I have said here that such funds should properly be allqcated primarily to modernization of existing
facilities, rather than to new structural approaches such as dams. One rule stifling conservation practices is the prohibition against using saved water to irrigate new lands. Eg., Salt River Valley Users'
Ass'n v. Kovacovich, 3 Ariz. App. 28, 411 P.2d 201 (1966). California has modified the rule legislatively. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1010-1011 (West 1985 Supp.).
60. See generally CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, supra note 48, at 408.
61. Id.
62. Over a decade ago the National Water Commission called for reform of pricing policies. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 15, at 303-05. More recently, publications of Resources for
the Future, The Conservation Foundation, and the Environmental Defense Fund have emphasized
pricing. See, e.g., A. KNEESE & F. LEE BROWN, supra note 30, at 246-47; CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, supra note 48, at 408-09; ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, TRADING CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS FOR WATER 26-28 (1983). See also, e.g., Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of
Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1985). Gottlieb & Wiley, Wall Street Journal, Nov.
20, 1984, at 30, col. 3, make this projection:
The environmentalists' clout is likely to increase during the next four years. They have seized
the initiative on the issues of cost and subsidies, and their advocacy of such concepts as marginal cost pricing and price elasticity will continue to build support. After the Carter years, the
environmentalists have rediscovered the potential for grass-roots support and have learned to
work with conservatives who are truly concerned about runaway costs.
63. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.460 (1979); OR. REV. STAT; §§ 540.720, 540.990(2) (1983).
64. See generally Pring & Tomb, supra note 48. Professor Sax has observed that, in the judicial
opinions on water waste, "it is easy to be misled by the inconsistency between what the courts say and
what they do." J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING & POLICY- CASES & MATERIALS, 272-73 (1968).
65. See, e.g., Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Dangberg, 81 F. 73, 97 (D.Nev. 1897) ("An excessive
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put teeth into the requirement.6 6 Other courts have taken the approach that wasted water is deemed abandoned or forfeited. 67 In
either case, a water user-be it a city, farm, mine, or manufacturing
plant- consuming two thousand acre feet when one thousand would
suffice is held to have no right to the wasted thousand: the operation is
effectively forced to improve its waterworks to accommodate the

lesser, although sufficient, quantity of water. As the Colorado
Supreme Court, the nation's busiest water court, has explained in im-

plementing its "maximum utilization doctrine,, 61 "there is read into
every decree awarding priorities the implied limitation that diversions
are limited to those sufficient for the purposes for which the appropriation was made, regardless of the fact69that such limitation may be less
than the decreed rate of diversion.",
Modem values have led to the alteration of water law in another
diversion of water for any purpose cannot be regarded as a diversion to a beneficial use. Water in this
state is too scarce, needful, and precious for irrigation and other purposes, to admit of waste.")
66. The Idaho Supreme Court has employed the beneficial use doctrine to combat the widespread
use of inefficient conveyancing systems. The quantity of water to which an irrigator is entitled must be
measured at the point that it enters the conveyancing system, thus requiring the irrigator to bear any
loss that occurs after the water enters the system. Glenn Dale Ranches, Inc. v. Shaub, 94 Idaho 585,
588, 494 P.2d 1029, 1032 (1972). In Wyoming, the Supreme Court refused to approve a transfer of an
asserted water right that involved waste, saying that "an appropriator does not acquire a water right in
water which he historically has not beneficially used." Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Control,
578 P.2d 557, 569-70 (Wyo. 1978). See also Green River Dev. Co. v. FMC Corp., 660 P.2d 339 (Wyo.
1983). The Utah Supreme Court has also refused to recognize the longstanding waste of water as a
beneficial use. See In re Water Rights of Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 10 Utah 2d 77, 348 P.2d 679,
681-82 (1960).
Oregon cases have recognized the important principle that a diversion of a certain quantity of
water may have been reasonable at the time it was originally made, but that the subsequent development of more efficient technology may, over time, require that the original quantity of water diverted be
decreased in order to reduce waste. See, e.g., Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Lynch, 215 Or. 523, 336 P.2d
884 (1959). California courts, enforcing a constitutional provision against "waste or unreasonable use,"
CAL. CONST., art. XIV, § 3, have held water users to a high standard of reasonableness. Eg, Joslin v.
Main Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 429 P.2d 889 (1967); see also infra notes
82-86.
67. See, e.g., State v. McLean, 62 N.M 264, 308 P.2d 983 (1957). See generally Shupe, supra
note 48, at 495-501.
68. The maximum utilization rubric was first articulated in Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320,
336, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (1968):
It is implicit in these constitutional provisions [in CoLo. CONs-r. art. XVI, § 6] that, along
with vested rights, there shall bemaximum utilization of the water of this state. As administration of water approaches its second century the curtain is opening upon the new drama of
maximum utilization and how constitutionally that doctrine can be integrated into the law of
vested rights. (emphasis in original)
The court later noted that "the policy of maximum utilization does not require a single-minded endeavor to squeeze every drop of water from the valley's aquifers.... Optimum use can only be achieved
with proper regard for all significant factors, including environmental and economic concerns. [citing
authority]." Alamosa-LaJara Water Users Protection Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 935 (Colo. 1983).
69. Weibert v. Rothe Bros., Inc., 200 Colo. 310, 318, 618 P.2d 1367, 1372 (1980). See also, e.g.,
United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S.
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context, outside of the waste issue. Traditionally, water could be used
only for beneficial uses, which were defined as domestic purposes and
commercial uses such as agriculture, industry, mining, power generation, and stockraising.7 ° In almost all cases this meant that water had
to be physically diverted from the stream in order to effect a valid
appropriation.7 1
Most western legislatures, however, have announced that recreation and wildlife are also beneficial uses of water. Many western states
have adopted instream flow programs that leave water in the stream,
unavailable for consumptive appropriation below a specified level, for
fish, wildlife, recreation, and aesthetics.72 The minimum stream-flow
programs are struggling, but they surely will be gradually expanded
and improved. 73 Several state water agencies have begun to take a
more activist role by denying applications or imposing conditions on
private water development projects in the public interest.7 4
The new directions I have discussed converge in five current,
ongoing sets of developments-two in California, two in Montana,
and one in Arizona-that tell us a great deal about the future of west-

ern water. The first is NationalAudubon Society v. Superior Court of
Ct. 193 (1983) ("It is settled that beneficial use expresses a dynamic concept, which is a variable according to conditions . . . and therefore over time").

70. See I W. HUTCHINS, supra note 2, at 522-545.
71. See, e.g., Hardy v. Beaver County Irrigation Co., 65 Utah 28, 234 P. 524 (1924); Simons v.
Inyo Cerro Gordo Mining & Power Co., 48 Cal. App. 524, 192 P. 144 (1920); Brand v. Lienkaemper,
72 Wash. 547, 130 P. 1147 (1913). In :a few instances the rule was relaxed to permit an appropriation
resulting from natural overflow over shallow streambanks onto irrigation fields. See, e.g., In re Silvies
River, 115 Or. 27, 237 P. 322 (1925), modified on other grounds, 122 Or. 47, 257 P. 693 (1927).
72. On the recognition of recreation and other non-traditional water users as beneficial uses, see
NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.030(2) (Supp. 1983); ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (1982); CAL. WATER CODE
§ 1243 (West 1971 & Supp. 1985). See generally Robie, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN WATER RIGHTS

ADMINISTRATION, 23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 917 (1977). On instream flow programs, see gener.1
ally Tarlock, supra note 37.
73. Instream flow protections in eight western states are assessed in J. BAGLEY, D. LARSON & L.
KAPALOSKI, ADAPTING APPROPRIATION WATER LAW TO ACCOMMODATE EQUITABLE CONSIDERATION OF INSTREAM FLOW USES (1983). The resistance by consumptive users to instream flow pro-

grams is typified by the implementation of the Oregon program. See Note, PreservingInstreamFlows in
Oregon's Rivers and Streams 11 ENVr'L. L. 379, 396-403 (1981). In Colorado, minimum levels have
been set on 713 stream segments covering 4186.97 stream miles and on 485 lakes. Memorandum from
Annie Janicki, Colorado Water Conservation Board (Mar. 5, 1985) These appropriations for instream
flows, of course, are very junior rights and are inadequately enforced. The state has never made a call
to protect its instream appropriations. Interview with Steven J. Shupe, Assistant Attorney General,
State of Colorado (Dec. 5, 1984). Nevertheless, even junior instream rights on heavily appropriated
streams can have one major impact; senior rights apparently cannot transfer their points of diversion
upstream if the transfer would affect a junior instream appropriation. See Farmers Highline Canal &
Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954) (senior irrigation rights cannot be
transferred upstream and put to a municipal use if injury would be caused to junior irrigation rights).
74. See generally Robie, The Public Interest in Water Rights Administration, 23 ROCKY MTN.
MIN L. INST. 917 (1977).
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Alpine County" (the Mono Lake case), which in my judgment is potentially as important as any development in western resources law
during the last several decades. The California Supreme Court held
that diversions by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
from the streams feeding Mono Lake were modified by the public trust
doctrine. In spite of the fact that those diversions had been made ear-

lier in the century, with great care taken to comply with both prior
appropriation and riparian law, the court found that public trust
rights in Mono Lake had always existed, had never been extinguished,
and must be accommodated when consumptive water rights are
granted. Just as it had done in water law a century and a quarter
earlier in Irwin v. Phillips,7 6 the California Supreme Court looked to
current societal values, finding that "the public trust has evolved in
tandem with the changing public perception of the values and uses of

waterways." 77 The court concluded that environmental factors, as
well as appropriative rights, must be taken into account: "Mono Lake
has long been treasured as a unique scenic, recreational and scientific
resource, but continued diversions threaten to turn it into a desert
wasteland." 7 8
75. 33 Cal.3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 413 (1983).
76. 5 Cal. 140 (1855), discussed supra text, notes 6-8.
77. 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356; 658 P.2d at 719. The California Supreme Court had earlier recognized
that private rights must comport with evolving public standards as recognized in the public trust doctrine. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal.3d 251, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (1971):
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing
public needs. In administering the trust the state is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization over another. There is a growing public recognition that
one of the most important public uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed within the tidelands trust-is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as
ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food
and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of
the area. It is not necessary to here define precisely all the public uses which encumber tidelands. (citation omitted)
78. 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353, 658 P.2d at 716. The fact that the perception of the California Supreme
Court in 1983 is indeed an evolution from earlier perceptions of the same watercourse is exemplified by
a comparison with this observation by a notable earlier visitor:
Mono Lake lies in a lifeless, treeless, hideous desert, eight thousand feet above the level of the
sea, and is guarded by mountains two thousand feet higher, whose summits are always
clothed in clouds. This solemn, silent, sailless sea-this lonely tenant of the loneliest spot on
earth-is little graced with the picturesque. It is an unpretending expanse of grayish water,
about a hundred miles in circumference, with two islands in its center, mere upheavals of rent
and scorched and blistered lava. . . . This water is not good for bruised places and abrasions
of the skin. We had a valuable dog. He had raw places on him. He had more raw places on
him than sound ones. He was the rawest dog I almost ever saw. He jumped overboard one
day to get away from the flies. But it was bad judgment. In his condition, it would have been
just as comfortable to jump into the fire. The alkali water nipped him in all the raw places
simultaneously, and he struck out for the shore with considerable interest. He yelped and
barked and howled as he went and by the time he got to the shore there was no bark to himfor he had barked the bark all out of his inside, and the alkali water had cleaned the bark all
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This drive to place reasonable limits on private uses in order to
allow the exercise of broader public trust rights is also reflected in the
law of North Dakota,79 Idaho,8 ° and Montana,8" and can be expected
to influence water law directly and indirectly throughout the West.
The recognition of the public trust doctrine in water law is the single
strongest statement that historic uses must accommodate modem
needs.
In spite of these advances, the truth is that the national environmental movement has placed issues of water quantity near the bottom
of its agenda. Air and water pollution, wilderness preservation, federal forest and rangeland practices, and toxic wastes have all been
given a kind of de facto priority. This is due in significant part to the
tradition of state control over water allocation. Even the considerable
efforts of firms such as the Environmental Defense Fund, Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund, National Wildlife Federation, and National Audubon Society have only scratched the surface considering the
thousands of major water decisions, made by state water agencies in
the nineteen western states, that go uncontested every year. My expectation is that the national groups are likely to conclude that water
quantity issues must in substantial part be treated as state issues and
that environmental organizations will establish water advocacy firms
for each western state, or perhaps for each two- or three-state region.
Only in this way can state water agencies be monitored effectively.
In short, this country has yet to establish an ethic for water quantity, as the nation has done for land, air, trees, some animals, and,
ironically, even water quality. Nevertheless, our rivers and lakes, and
the creatures that depend on them, touch deep and profound chords in
our society. Diverse movements in the law reflect those values. A
off his outside, and he probably wished he had never embarked in any such enterprise. He ran
round and round in a circle, and pawed the earth and clawed the air, and did three double
somersaults, sometimes backward and sometimes forward, in the most extraordinary manner.
He was not a demonstrative dog, as a general thing, but rather of a grave and serious turn of
mind, and I never saw him take so much interest in anything before. He finally struck out
over the mountains, at a gait which we estimated at about two hundred and fifty miles an
hour, and he is going yet. This was about nine years ago. We look for what is left of him
along here every day.
M. TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 265-67 (1872).
79. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457 (N.D. 1976).
80. Kootenai Envt'l Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983).
The Idaho Supreme Court expressly found that the California rule applies in Idaho. Id. at 1094.
81. Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984). For a current assessment of the public
trust doctrine in water law, see Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law: Discord
or Harmony?, 30 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17 (1985).

1985]

WESTERN WATER LAW IN TRANSITION

water quantity ethic is fast developing, and an even broader "watershed ethic," integrating all of the values of natural systems and best
management practices, will also eventually command public acceptance. It is shortsighted for any group concerned with water policy to
underestimate the growing force of these changing perceptions. That
is the ultimate lesson of the Mono Lake case.
The second event in California came to a head in June, 1984 when
the State Water Control Board issued an order entitled "Decision Regarding Misuse of Water By Imperial Irrigation District." 2 The district, located in southeastern California, is the largest user of Colorado
River water, having diverted in recent years about 2.9 million acre feet
annually of the roughly fourteen million acre feet produced by the
river each year.8 3 California has been receiving as much as 5.4 million
acre feet annually from the Colorado but that must drop to 4.4 million
acre feet, plus one-half of any surplus among the
lower basin states,
84
when the Central Arizona Project goes on line.
The Control Board ruled that the Imperial Irrigation District has
been violating California constitutional and statutory prohibitions
against waste and unreasonable use of water by allowing more than
one million acre feet, a thirty-eight percent loss, to enter the Salton Sea
as return flow. 5 This water was unavailable to other parties, including the Metropolitan Water District, who might otherwise use this
part of California's Colorado River entitlement. In this comprehensive ruling, the Board ordered the Imperial Irrigation District to submit a detailed plan for control of excessive leach and tail water, canal
seepage, and canal spills. The Board also ordered the development of
a rigorous water accounting and monitoring procedure to quantify actual water deliveries and system losses.8 6
82. In re Alleged Waste and Unreasonable Use of Water by Imperial Irrigation District, Decision
1600 California Water Resources Control Board (1984) [hereinafter cited as Control Board decision].
The Administrative proceedings are discussed in parallel litigation, Elmore v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.

159 Cal. App.3d 185, 205 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1984).
83. Control Board decision, supra note 82, at 7.

84. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 575-90 (1963).
85. Control Board decision, supra note 82, at 7. The provision in the California Constitution is
art. XIV, § 3. See also CAL. WATER CODE §§ 100, 275 (West 1971 & Supp. 1985).

86. Control Board Decision, supra note 82, at 67-71. The Imperial Irrigation District has challenged the Control Board's order in court. On March 28, 1985, a state trial judge ruled in a brief
opinion that the Control Board had authority to investigate, conduct an administrative hearing, make
findings on reasonable use, and issue an order of compliance, but that the Control Board was required
to institute a court action, with the reasonable use issue to be tried de novo, if the District refused to

comply with the Board's administrative order. Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water Resources
Control Board, No. 58706 (Cal. Super. Ct., Imperial County, Mar. 28, 1985). The State plans to appeal
the order. Interview with M. Anne Jenning, Deputy Attorney General, State of California (May 1,
1985).
The ramifications of the trial court's ruling are unclear. The District already has complied with
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Another set of recent developments involves the work of the
Montana Legislature in spring, 1985, when it adopted two measures,
one infusing a range of public interest notions into the state's water
code and the other ratifying an Indian water rights settlement. The
innovative public-interest legislation, H.B. 680,87 has four major features. It provides for the comprehensive application of public interest
criteria for initial permit applications and for changes in appropriative
rights,88 with the criteria being especially rigorous for diversions in
excess of 4000 acre feet.8 9 The 1985 Act flatly prohibits private appropriations for transport out of specified basins or for any consumptive
use in excess of 4000 acre feet; for those categories, only the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation may make appropriations.' The Act conditions out-of-state transport of water.9 ' Finally,
many aspects of the Control Board's order. Interview with Robert W. Miller, California Department of
Water Resources (Apr. 24, 1985). The political climate in Imperial Valley is much more favorable
toward conservation measures and it may be unnecessary for the State to go to court to enforce the
administrative order. Jennings interview, supra this note. Even if the trial court is correct in finding
that the District is entitled to a de novo judicial hearing on reasonable use before the Control Board can
enforce its order, the reasoning may be inapplicable to most other water users in California. The District possesses pre-1914 rights that have not yet been adjudicated under state law. The trial court's
ruling may well not apply to appropriations made after the passage of the California's Water Commission Act of 1913 (which took effect in 1914) or to pre-1914 rights adjudicated under the 1913 Act; the
Control Board's authority to issue enforceable orders concerning water waste with regard to permits
issued pursuant to the 1913 Act appears to be much more clearly stated. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 182551 (West Supp. 1985). In any event, the Control Board is continuing to investigate misuse of water in
the state and to enforce the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against waste. Jennings interview,
supra this note.
87. H.B. 680, 49th Leg., 1985 Mont. Laws- [hereinafter cited as H.B. 680]. The legislation
closely follows legislation recommended by the Select Committee on Water Marketing. The initative,
and relevant Montana water law, are examined in Final Report of the Select Committee on Water
Marketing. SELECT COMMITTEE ON WATER MARKETING, FINAL REPORT TO THE 49TH MONT. LEG.
(Jan. 1985) (copies available from Environmental Quality Council, State Capital, Helena, Montana
59620) [hereinafter cited as SELECT COMMITrTEE REPORT].
88. See H.B. 680, supra note 87, § 4 (criteria for issuance of permit; to be codified at MOTrr. CODE
ANN. § 85-2-311); id., § 7 (changes in appropriation rights; to be codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2402). The change in use provision applies to changes in the place of diversion, the place of use, the
purpose of use, or the place of storage. Id. § 1(5).
89. For such diversions, the applicant must show by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed application is a "reasonable use" which requires consideration of, among other things, minimum
stream flows for existing water rights and aquatic life; the effects on water quality; and the creation of,
or contribution to, saline seep. Id. § 4(2). The Department must examine the proposal to determine
the existence of significant adverse environmental impacts, thus triggering an environmental assessment. Id. § 4(2)(e)(vi). These public interest provisions expand and replace MONT. CODE ANN. § 852-311, a temporary two-year measure enacted in 1983. The more onerous "level 2" public interest
provisions described here will apply to a limited number of applications; only 56 of 8000 permit applications between 1973 and 1985 were for diversions exceeding 4000 acre feet. SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 87, at VI-4.
90. H.B. 680, supra note 87, § 3 (to be codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-301). The designated basins are the following, including their tributaries: the Clark Fork River, the Kootenai River,
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H.B. 680 institutes a limited water leasing program.92 The only way in
which a private user can transport water out of the specified basins or
obtain rights to consume in excess of 4000 acre feet is to lease the
water from the Department. 9 3 The water leasing program is modest in
several respects, among them the fact that the 4000-acre-feet-consumptive limit on appropriations is high enough that it will apply only
to extremely large projects. 94 Nevertheless, the 1985 Act offers several
valuable concepts in its broad-based imposition of public rights, and
its break with traditional laissez-faire prior appropriation law.
In 1985, the Montana Legislature also approved a water rights
compact between the state and the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the
Fort Peck Reservation.9 5 There have been two other settlements of
Indian water rights in recent years, 6 but the Fort Peck-Montana
Compact is noteworthy because it is due in part to the Montana Re9
served Water Rights Compact Commission (Compact Commission), 7
the only attempt by a state to institutionalize water rights negotiations
with Indian tribes. The Compact Commission process has moved
haltingly--of the seven Montana tribes, the Blackfeet have so far refused to participate and a 1983 Fort Peck-Montana Compact was tentatively agreed to by the negotiators, but the Compact Commission
never submitted it to the legislature for ratification.9 Nevertheless,
the ratification of the renegotiated 1985 Fort Peck-Montana Compact
seems to offer preliminary validation of Montana's compact-negotiation approach.
the St. Mary River, the Little Missouri River, the Yellowstone River, and the Missouri River to its
confluence with the Yellowstone. Id. § 3(2)(a)(i).
91. See, e.g., H.B. 680, supra note 87, § 4(3)(b) (issuance of permits for appropriation and transportation out-of-state), § 7(5) (changes in appropriation rights for the withdrawal and transportation of
appropriated groundwater for use outside the state). On interstate transporting of water, see supra note
37.
92. See H.B. 680, supra note 87, § 13. The program is described in SELECT COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 87, at VI-9 to -12.
93. H.B. 680, supra note 87, § 3(2)(b).
94. Only two Montana agricultural appropriators applied for consumptive rights in excess of
4000 acre feet per year between 1973 and 1985. SELECT COMMIrEE REPORT, supra note 87, at VI-10
to -11. The coverage for the leasing program is narrower than for the "level 2" public interest criteria,
see supra note 89, because the floor for leasing is 4000 acre feet consumptive while the floor for the
"level 2" public interest criteria is 4000 diverted.
95. State of Montana/Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Indian Reservation Compact,
ratified
in S.B. 467, 49th Leg. 1985 Mont. Laws - (quantifying reserved water rights of Assiniboin and
Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Indian Reservation and providing guarantees for the water rights of certain
non-Indians living in water basins within or adjacent to the Reservation boundaries).
96. Pub. L. No. 95-328, 92 Stat. 409 (1978), as modified by Pub. L. No. 98-530, 98 Stat. 2698
(1984) (Ak Chin Indian Community of Arizona); Pub. L. No. 97-293, Title III, 96 Stat. 1274 (1982)
(San Xavier Papago Reservation of Arizona).
97. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-212 (1983).
98. SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 87, at IV-16 to -17.
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Some tribes oppose any present quantification of their futurelooking reserved rights and are opposed to negotiations. Others, however, believe that the parties can tailor an individualized resolution
better than can a judge and that under the right circumstances the
certainty inherent in a negotiated settlement can be preferable to the
protracted litigation required to adjudicate these enormously complex
disputes. It may be that the Fort Peck-Montana Compact of 1985 and
the Compact Commission process offer a glimpse of the future on
these sensitive and far-reaching issues.
The final recent event is the first level of fruition of the 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Act, 99 the most far-reaching statutory water conservation program ever adopted by any state. In
December, 1984, the Director of the Department of Water Resources
issued the first management plans for active management areas
(AMAs).t°1 These plans are the primary implementation mechanisms
for the 1980 Act, the product of a fascinating struggle and reconciliation among the mining industry, irrigators, municipalities, the Department of the Interior, Arizona Governor Bruce Babbitt, and the
relentless mandate issued by the state's aridity.101
99. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-401 to -637 (Supp. 1984-85). See generally Kyl, The 1980
Arizona Groundwater Management Act: From Inception to Current Constitutional Challenge, 53 U.
COLO. L. REV. 471 (1982); Higdon & Thompson, The 1980 Arizona GroundwaterManagement Code,
1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 621.
100. See, e.g., ARIZONA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, MANAGEMENT PLAN, FIRST MANAGEMENT PERIOD: 1980-1990 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Phoenix AMA (Active Management Area) Management Plan]. Management Plans were also issued in December, 1984, for the Prescott and Tucson
Active Management Areas. The 1980 Act established four initial AMAs, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-411 (Supp. 1984-85), which included about 80% of Arizona's population, 70% of the state's
groundwater overdraft, and 60% of the groundwater pumping. K. Ferris, The Development of the New
Arizona Groundwater Code (Oct. 30, 1984) (to be published in 1985 in the proceedings of a groundwater
symposium entitled "Groundwater, Crisis or Opportunity," sponsored by the Univ. of Texas at Austin
and Texas A & M Univ. during Oct. 29-31, 1984; and also excerpted from GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT: A KEY ISSUE FOR THE 80's (T. James & S. Ballard eds.), soon to be published) [hereinafter
cited as Ferris]. The Director of Water Resources must develop a series of five successive management
plans for each AMA through the year 2025, when groundwater withdrawals may not exceed discharge;
the conservation requirements will become more rigorous in each successive plan. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 45-561 to -566 (Supp. 1984-85). The initial plans, cited above, cover the management period
ending in 1990.
101. The history of the 1980 Act is told well in Connall, A History of the Arizona Groundwater
ManagementAct, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313. The state established a Groundwater Study Commission in
1977 to address the increasingly serious overdraft situation, id. at 323, but the long-simmering tensions
among the various interest groups made progress difficult. For example, Jim Bush, the colorful Phoenix attorney representing mining interests, laid the blame for the overdraft condition at the irrigators'
feet and fought against potential profits to the farmers if agricultural land were to be retired: "We're not
going to buy farms so that the farmers can move to La Jolla and raise martinis." Id. at 325. Connall
has extolled Governor Babbitt's abilities to grasp the difficult factual and legal issues and to move the
negotiators toward consensus. Id. at 331-32. A key impetus was Interior Secretary Cecil Andrus's
personal visit to Phoenix and his insistence that the Department would allocate no Central Arizona
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The central provisions of the Act and the recent management
10 2
plans are a blueprint for serious conservation of western water.
Among many other things, The Act provides for a strong state regulatory agency;103 the imposition of mandatory water duties for individual farm units based upon specified conservation practices;" a
prohibition against opening new irrigated acres within the AMAs; 1 5 a
program for retiring land from irrigation;10 6 compulsory conservation
Project (CAP) water unless the state enacted an effective groundwater code. Id. at 329-30. Andrus was
satisfied with the 1980 Act and CAP water was not delayed. Id. at 344.
102. The Act was challenged on constitutional grounds on the theory that existing Arizona law
provided for ownership of groundwater by overlying landowners and that the restrictive provisions of
the code constituted a taking. State and federal courts have both upheld the Act. See Town of Chino
Valley v. City of Prescott, 131 Ariz. 78, 638 P.2d 1324 (1981), appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1101 (1982);
Cherry v. Steiner, 543 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Ariz. 1982), afid, 716 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1719 (1984). The Arizona Supreme Court dismissed language in earlier opinions ("dictum
thrice repeated is still dictum," 638 P.2d at 1327), and held that "there is no right of ownership of
groundwater in Arizona prior to its capture and withdrawal from the common supply.
Id. at
1328.
103. The negotiators in conservative Arizona finally settled on the creation of a new agency, the
Department of Water Resources, with broad-based powers to implement the Act. See, e.g., ARMZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 45-102 (Supp. 1984-85). See generally Kyl, supra note 99, at 483-84. Ferris has explained some of the reasons:
The concept of concentrating decision-making authority at the state level was not accepted
without controversy. In its 1979 Draft Report, the Groundwater Management Study Commission recommended that management of groundwater should be carried out primarily by
local management entities according to statewide statutory guidelines with the State exercising oversight and enforcement powers.
The negotiators, however, ultimately recommended that the Commission reject giving
local management entities decision-making authority. Agricultural representatives had begun
to fear that municipalities would control any election for members of a local management
entity and that management by local entities would therefore mean management by the cities.
Other representatives, most notably mining, had always worried that members of the local
management entities would be unable to withstand political pressure from their neighbors and
that management by a local entity would therefore mean no management. Finally, several
negotiators became increasingly concerned that each local management entity might interpret
a complex law differently resulting in strikingly divergent management plans for each AMA
and numerous legal challenges. Gradually the consensus shifted toward centralized state
management with AMAs as the focal point of management activity.
Ferris, supra note 100, at 10-11.
104. In each management plan, a water duty is calculated for each farm unit (one farm or contiguous farms with similar soils and cropping patterns). For the first management plans, the calculations
assume the use of conservation practices such as lined canals and land levelling. See, e.g., Phoenix
AMA Management Plan, supra note 100, at 39-60, 130-35. Later plans will be based on more advanced
practices such as drip irrigation. After a phase-in period (January 1, 1987 for the initial plans), an
irrigator may not apply water in excess of the prescribed duty. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-561
to -566 (Supp. 1984-85), and Ferris, supra note 100, at 15-16.
105. No water, including CAP water, may be used to irrigate land that had not been in production as of January 1, 1980. AMIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-452 (Supp. 1984-85). Existing irrigation
rights are grandfathered and can be transferred. Id. §§ 45-472 to -474. On the different classes of
rights recognized by the Act, see Kyl, supra note 99, at 484-91.
106. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-566 (Supp. 1984-85). Once retired, land cannot be returned to
irrigation. Id. § 45-473.
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within metropolitan residential areas;107 and the imposition of
"ground water withdrawal fees" (a politically necessary euphemism
for pump taxes).108
The 1980 Act does not go as far as some would wish; for example,
it encourages, but does not actually set, limits on pumpage. Nevertheless, by any reasonable standard it is a remarkable piece of legislation.
It foreshadows in bright terms the possibilities for effective combat
against waste and overuse.
The judicial and legislative recognition of public environmental
rights, illustrated by the Mono Lake case and the work of the 1985
Montana Legislature; the crackdown on waste, exemplified by the Imperial Valley decision; the willingness to settle long-simmering disputes over Indian water rights, evidenced by the Fort Peck-Montana
Compact; and the campaign against overuse, demonstrated by the Arizona Groundwater Code, are all in their infancy. Regardless of what
they may say, many courts and most administrators are still reluctant
to order the hard measures necessary to achieve the goals of conservation and environmental protection. But these developments are accelerating and will continue apace. Further, in ways I will now explain,
they have major ramifications for the central issue of the years to
come, which is to reach a fair accommodation between the traditional
uses favored by the prior appropriation doctrine and the new uses recognized by contemporary society.
The decisions against waste and in favor of public rights operate
from an unspoken, but critical, premise-a notion, expounded upon
by Professor Joseph Sax and others, that underlies recent cases in the
field of land use. These decisions have upheld legislation allowing restrictive zoning, setting height limits on buildings, and prohibiting
practices such as landfills, and have required public access to areas
107. Residential users are subjected to per capita reductions. Id. § 45-564(A)(2). The initial
management plans, supra note 100, are based on reasonable use of 140 gallons per day per capita.
Tucson has come close to that figure through its highly successful "Beat the Peak" program, but use in
Phoenix still exceeds 250 gallons per day. Ferris, supra note 100, at 16-17. Existing supplies of municipal water are not required to meet the 140 gallon per day limit but must reduce per capita deliveries by
6-11% within two years. New municipal providers must meet the 140 gallon per day standard. See
Phoenix AMA Management Plan, supra note 100, at 61-81. See also Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Foundation, Water Law Newsletter No. 3 at 1-2 (1984).
108. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-611 (Supp. 1984-85). The Director has set a fee of $0.75 per
acre foot for calendar year 1985, which will be applied toward the annual administrative costs of approximately $1.5 million. Ferris, supra note 100, at 20. No more than $1 per acre foot may be used to
defray administrative costs, but during the second ten-year plan an additional $2 fee can be levied to
create a fund for augmenting the water supply. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-611(2) (Supp. 1984-85).
During the third planning period another $2 fee can be imposed and applied toward the retirement of
agricultural land. Id. § 45-611(3).
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such as dry sand beaches.1 9 All of those results cut deeply into traditional prerogatives of private owners of land. They are incursions on
the basic form of land ownership, the fee simple absolute, traditionally
considered a guarantee of total ownership.
We now learn that the term "fee simple absolute" is a misnomer.
Private property rights are always defined by public authority in the
first instance, and private land has always been subject to public rights:
regulatory prerogatives in fulfillment of the police power and property
rights in the form of the public trust doctrine. The public rights may
have laid inchoate, but they existed from the moment any owner received a deed, so there is no taking of a property interest when the
public rights are exercised to limit the use of land.
These limitations on the ownership of land apply directly to property rights in water. Appropriative rights are not as absolute as they
have been assumed to be. In all states they are subject to the prohibition against waste. If a user is applying too much water, there is only
a privilege, not a right, in the wasted water and the state may require a
lower duty of water based on the governmental power to regulate for
the general welfare. Many states will be prepared to enforce an implied condition under the public trust doctrine that major environmental resources cannot be substantially impaired. Further, decreed rights
are impliedly subject to obligations to other states, nations, and Indian
tribes.
The fact that state-granted water rights, even if decreed, are not
as fixed and hard as commonly believed is critical in this transition
period of water law. Water now diverted but wasted can be freed up
for other uses. Judges have long been solicitous of existing water uses
but there is an increasing recognition that there are few equities in
poor water practices. On so-called overappropriated rivers, where
there is supposedly no water available for new uses, an accommodation can almost always be made if existing users adopt good conservation techniques. "' This is likely to be a primary method by which
109. See Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. Rav. 481 (1983).
Leading cases include Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984); Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355

(N.J. 1984); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal.3d 419, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709 (1983), discussed supra text at notes 75-78, and Just v. Marinette County, 56
Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). These concepts are discussed in the context of groundwater regulation in Kelly, Management of Groundwater through Mandatory Conservation, 61

DEN.

L.J. 1, 17-34

(1983).
110. Of course, water scarcity is not alleviated if conserved water is appropriated and consumptively used by development interests. As Professor Helen Ingram has put it, "Conservation should not
be regarded as an end in itself, but rather as a means to achieve some aim ..
" (as quoted in Udall,
The Tucson Paradox, 87 AUDUBON 98, 99 (Jan. 1985)). See also the "conserve and reallocate" theory
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present uses can be reconciled with demands for water for energy, instream uses, and Indian tribes."'
In conclusion, then, we are finally assessing the value of the prior
appropriation system, bred in the mid-nineteenth century, to the modem American West. To be sure, some components of the doctrine
have enduring worth. The West could not have been settled, and
would be in a significant measure of disarray today, if rights to the
essential resource could not be charted with reasonable certainty. Justice Rehnquist's analogy between land titles and water titles is not
inapt. 112

But other elements of the prior appropriation system are failures
in these times. The doctrine breeds wastefulness on a number of
counts; the basic assurance of certainty has too often been twisted into
a guarantee to use whatever amount of water was diverted by outmoded systems in a long-ago era of relative plenty. The "use it or lose it"
mentality, fueled in part by court decisions awarding priorities among
states according to first diversion,' 1 3 creates a rush among states on
interstate rivers to dam up the West's deep canyons in order to capture
water and thereby preserve consumptive rights. Prior appropriation
takes aim at the main hope of struggling Indian tribes. If unchecked,
it can be the death knell for the streams that it draws dry. Western
water law, often hailed as a laissez-faire, market-oriented system, in
fact is riddled with federal subsidies, restrictions against alienation,
and preferences for inefficient uses; to the extent that the market does
operate, prior appropriation is a reminder that the market traditionally has been ineffectual in protecting minorities and the environment.
The ultimate problem, of course, is that the old doctrine forces us
to proceed today according to the values of a century and a quarter
ago. The promising young shoots in this time of transition all are nurtured by our determination to decide by contemporary standards, not
those of a distant time.
set out in Weatherford, supra note 48. If instream flow programs are put in place, then relatively junior
public rights will become more senior as water becomes available when older uses become more efficient. Further, states probably have the authority to pass legislation providing that saved or abandoned
water reverts to state control, rather than being available to junior users by what one of my colleagues
calls "primogeniture." Such legislation, while it admittedly limits the ability of juniors to move up in
the system of priority, would probably be considered a permissible regulation rather than a taking of a
vested right. See supra notes 66-69, 109 and accompanying text. In this manner, saved and abandoned
water would be made available for allocation by the states according to contemporary demands.
111. This is a two-edged sword for Indian tribes. They, too, will have to continue, or adopt, good
water practices. The law of waste will be applied to Indian rights just as surely as it will be to statecreated rights. Thus tribal planning must take into account additional expenses for conservation.
112. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983).
113. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 104 S. Ct. 2433 (1984); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S.

589 (1945).
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We are, then, in the process of altering our essential ways of
thinking about western water. This reconceptualization is reflected in
common terminology. Phrases'like "water organization" and "water
user" have traditionally held narrow meanings. Perhaps we are near
the point where we fully recognize that water organizations include
not only the Salt River Project and the Denver Water Board but also
the Wilderness Society and the Navajo Tribe. We count as water users
not just a hard-working farmer and a coal-fired plant but also a rafter,
a trout fisherman, and even an artist on the bank of a mountain
stream. As these notions incrementally become embedded in the court
opinions and the statutes, we push on toward a legal structure that
fairly reflects the diversity and richness of the modern American West.

